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Tata Trusts Declares Chandrasekaran Reappointment Invalid, Citing AoA Breach

· · 4 min read

Tata Trusts has declared N. Chandrasekaran's reappointment as Tata Sons chairman invalid, asserting the September 17 resolution failed to meet a mandatory Articles of Association condition. The Trusts, holding 66% of Tata Sons, stated the required affirmative vote from its nominee directors was not secured.

In a significant corporate governance dispute, Tata Trusts has challenged the validity of N. Chandrasekaran's reappointment as chairman of Tata Sons, stating the resolution passed on September 17, 2026, did not adhere to a crucial requirement within the company's Articles of Association (AoA).

According to a statement issued by Tata Trusts, the resolution to extend Chandrasekaran's tenure by another five years "was not validly passed and has no legal effect," deeming it "void ab initio" in the eyes of the law.

The Core of the Dispute: AoA Conditions

Tata Sons' board had approved Chandrasekaran's reappointment with a 4:1 vote, with Tata Trusts chairman Noel Tata being the sole director to vote against it. However, Tata Trusts, which collectively holds approximately 66% of Tata Sons, argues that the overall board vote count is not the decisive factor.

The Trusts assert that the AoA mandates any such decision to receive the affirmative support of at least a majority of the directors nominated by Tata Trusts. With two Tata Trusts nominee directors on the Tata Sons board, and one voting in favour while the other voted against, the Trusts stated, "Majority amongst two is two and not one." Consequently, the required support was not given, causing the condition and the resolution to fail.

Rejection of Casting Vote and Deadlock Claims

Tata Trusts further rejected the notion that the Tata Sons chairman's casting vote could resolve the issue. They clarified that a casting vote is applicable only when there is an equality of votes at the overall board level, not among the Trusts' nominee directors. "Whether the result of the vote was 4:1, or any other figure, is irrelevant," the Trusts emphasized, adding, "A condition is either met, or it is not. In this case, the condition was not met."

The Trusts also dismissed suggestions that their refusal to support the resolution created a deadlock that could paralyze Tata Sons. They argued that exercising a protective right conferred by a company's constitution is not a deadlock but rather the constitution functioning as intended.

Precedent from Supreme Court Case

Highlighting past legal battles, Tata Trusts reminded that Tata Sons cannot now disregard the very protections in its AoA that it vigorously defended before the Supreme Court during the dispute concerning Cyrus Mistry's removal. The affirmative voting rights of the Trusts' nominee directors, under Articles 104B and 121, were central to those proceedings.

During that time, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had deemed these rights oppressive, while complainants sought their deletion. Tata Sons, however, opposed these attempts, defending the rights as a legitimate protection agreed upon by shareholders and representing the Trusts' entitlement as a majority shareholder. The Supreme Court ultimately accepted Tata Sons' arguments, setting aside the finding that the Articles were oppressive. "The Company cannot now disown the protection it went to the Supreme Court to preserve," the Trusts' statement concluded.

"Governance Gap" Argument Refuted

Addressing the broader discussion, Tata Trusts also rejected the suggestion that listing Tata Sons would enhance corporate governance by filling a perceived "governance gap." The Trusts pointed out that Tata Sons has voluntarily adhered to standards applicable to public companies for years, despite not being listed.

Its AoA includes provisions for independent directors, an audit committee, a nomination and remuneration committee, rules governing related-party transactions, and director retirement by rotation, alongside a code of conduct for preventing insider trading. These measures, recorded in Tata Sons' annual and corporate governance reports, were voluntarily adopted for transparency. The Trusts asserted, "A company that adopted these standards by choice is not a company in need of the discipline that listing is said to supply."

Ultimately, the Trusts stated, the larger question is not about which governance framework is superior or who governs the company better, but rather "who is left in the room to speak for the millions of underserved and excluded Indians, who have been at the centre of everything Tata Trusts have done, for more than a hundred and thirty years."

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